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The paradigm of Post-Modern philosophy according the Stanley Rosen is usually defined 
as an attack on Modern philosophy, specifically the Enlightenment of the XVIIIth century. 
However, Rosen asserted that post-modernism is an extension of modernism, rather than purely 
critical philosophers or radical philosophers.1 The modern paradigm of philosophy focuses on 
the debate between objective quantitative knowledge and the individual. There was an inherent 
desire to understand the individual and what it means to be an individual in the modern era, 
while also trying to amalgamate experience of the individual into a single understanding.2 The 
desire for a single understanding leads to the need for an epistemological approach to 
philosophy; to begin from a common ground of knowing in order to progress towards ‘better’ 
knowing. The post-modernist accepts and continues the idea of mass quantitative data and the 
individual; however, the subjective knowledge of the individual is given more weight than 
before.3 The shift from ‘objective’ knowledge to ‘subjective’ knowledge as dominant, allowed 
for the hermeneutic approach; starting from the assumption that no common ground exists, 
interpreting what is known, in order to truly come to know a common ground. Ultimately 
allowing us to overcome the dominance of purely subjective or purely objective knowledge 
based reality.  
I will focus on two post-modernists, Richard Rorty and Alasdair MacIntyre. Both of these 
philosophers attack and criticize the previous philosophical paradigm (modernism). MacIntyre 
more clearly attacks the enlightenment, while Rorty attacks the epistemological philosophy that 
was a product of the enlightenment. They both engaged in a historical analysis of the previous 
paradigm, in order to explain why it created a problem (Rorty) or why it was a failure 
                                                 
1 Stanley Rosen, Hermeneutics as Politics, 2nd ed., (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 3.   
2 Rosen, Hermeneutics as Politics, 3.  
3 Ibid  
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(MacIntyre). Their similar approaches to their criticisms allowed them to come to the realization 
of the practicality and potential uses of the predictive sciences. However, they both differ on the 
current and future successes of the predictive sciences in politics and governance. In the context 
of the texts, the purpose of a government is not to engage in politics, but rather to engage in 
control and order, and to create a world in which people follow and appear to be free. There is no 
need for hermeneutic interpretative dialogue on public affairs (politics),4 there is only 
bureaucratic authority on the knowledge of private affairs of human action (psychology and 
governance).  
This paper explores the notion that a dominantly bureaucratic (quantitative knowledge 
based) state is not one in which people are free. Through a hermeneutic analysis of certain texts 
that discuss where such a form of governance comes from and why it does not allow for 
freedom: Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and Alasdair MacIntyre’s After 
Virtue. Rorty’s text focuses on the benefits of behaviourism as a means of knowing the way in 
which people ‘are’ and MacIntyre’s work touches on the shortcomings of behaviourism and the 
social predictive sciences, and how they affect bureaucracy and government. Through a 
hermeneutic analysis of these texts I have developed a proper and substantive defence of 
behaviourism and its relation to bureaucratic governance. Once the argument has been properly 
established, the fallacies within it can be examined and the fundamental argument that people 
should be controlled as animals, removing their freedom and eliminating politics, can be 
properly critiqued and dismissed. 
  The post-modern problem of hermeneutics against psychology stems from the problem 
of epistemology, which assumes in the existence of a common ground of knowing, and that 
                                                 
4 Ibid, 87. 
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through discourse or proof, all can be shown and come to what ‘is.’5 This understanding of 
epistemology is inherently problematic in its assumption that the common ground is already 
known; one must simply show it and others will follow suit. All knowledge comes from that 
point and is constrained to progress purely from that point. Hermeneutics as a contrast to 
epistemology, assumes in the existence of no common ground.6 All knowledge discovered 
through hermeneutic philosophy does not progress. One may acknowledge in the existence of 
what is known, however, one must not bind themselves to it. The hermeneutic process must be a 
discovery starting from not knowing or from not knowing enough and moving towards a point of 
knowing, or discovering something that was not known before. This is the hermeneutic 
assumption, that from not knowing, and through interpretation one can come to a point of 
knowing, either in private or public.  
It is these two fundamental problems (philosophic assumptions), the problem of 
epistemology (assumption of a common ground) and the problem of hermeneutics (assumption 
knowledge can be gained from a lack of knowledge), that ultimately leads Rorty to believe the 
best route for society is psychology and the predictive sciences, with particular emphasis on the 
behavioural sciences. The problem of epistemology begins with the mind-body problem, which 
creates a philosophical process that tries to give a general theory of knowledge and of reality 
through our knowledge, which is to understand that which is outside the mind. The mind builds 
what is outside of it (the physical world), in order for us to understand reality.7 The theory of 
reality explained in this fashion means that our mind not only interprets reality, it creates it. This 
                                                 
5 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature: Thirtieth-Anniversary Edition, (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2009): 316. – This problem of a pre-existing and known common ground is also examined and 
shown in MacIntyre’s explanation of the enlightenments failure.  
6 Ibid, 317.  
7 Rorty, 3.  
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means reality does not exist without us (a persons mind) creating it to be as such. That means 
without our minds and our ability to understand, we cannot know whether there is a reality or 
not. Our mind exists in reality, yet it is separate from the physical reality, which our mind creates 
so that we may understand it. Thus the problem is the notion that the mind and the body are 
separate, yet somehow linked (mind body problem). Such a separation means that either all 
things are a creation of the mind, or all things are physical and the mind does not exist.  
  For Rorty, and epistemic philosophers, there must be a physical world.  Thus, the mind-
body notion leads to a desire to discover the link between the physical and the mind and what 
that link might be, in order to free oneself from oppressive thoughts.8 To make the world safe for 
those who think outside what is held, to allow society to move forward.9 We see this 
understanding in Rorty’s explanation of Hobbes, that post-Cartesian thought, he was able to 
come to an explanation that all things can be explained within the physical realm, that there may 
not be any higher notions of universals outside the physical world (in line with Hobbes notion 
that mental things are absurd10). This understanding is necessary for a psychological world: one 
that can be explained empirically and be founded completely within the physical.11 The desire of 
freeing oneself from oppressive thoughts and accepting the empirical truth of reality, is one that 
allowed for the move towards the secularization of philosophy. As such the world can be 
                                                 
8 The link will eventually be shown to be a mental creation, and thus a physical thing. 
9 Ibid, 131. – Rorty bases the majority of his philosophical understanding of epistemology on Kantian philosophy. 
Which is why he eventually came to explain Hegel, since for some Hegel is an extension of Kant. The understanding 
that the enlightenment was necessary for man to leave behind his oppressive thoughts in order to progress, is clearly 
seen within Kantian political philosophy. Kant’s third proposition he explains that it is in mans nature to use his 
freedom in society to complete his rational capabilities. The fourth proposition explains that we can either flourish 
as a society, or live in darkness hiding our mental capabilities. Enlightened people happen in society, and 
enlightened people in society allow flourishing (progress); (Kant. Political Writings, Second, Enlarged Edition, ed. 
Hans Reiss, trans, by N. B. Nisbet, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 43-45.  
10 Hobbes, “Leviathan,” ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1994), 20-21. 
11 Rorty, 179. – It is at this point in the text that Rorty begins to justify the idea that philosophy has run its course 
due to the field as a whole accepting the ideas of behaviourism naturally causes the field to have no choice but to 
give into psychology.  
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discovered and explained within the bounds of a completely physical one. Further, accepting 
religious ideas while accepting a physical world that must be discovered had to be overcome, 
since they are revealed and in essence already known.   
Religious truths do not need philosophic inquiry or scientific study in order to understand 
the way in which the world ‘is’ or ‘ought to be.’12 Thus if one intends on engaging in philosophy 
and desires to understand the world as ‘is,’ and not predetermined, one must discover it as ‘is’, 
not as it is told. Thus, philosophy “[becomes], for the intellectuals, a substitute for religion.”13 As 
one rejects the notion of religious beliefs, there is a need to replace the void of beliefs. For 
intellectuals it is only natural that they would desire to replace them with philosophic beliefs and 
to engage in philosophy to fill the void. Philosophy allows those that engage in it the ability to 
discover the truth of the world, in such a way that religion does not seem to. It is not something 
one must simply take for granted, they themselves have to work for it and discover it for 
themselves. They may either do this epistemically or hermeneutically.   
This process of secularization was necessary to allow intellectuals to start the 
enlightenment project. However, this project was destined to fail from the very beginning. All 
the key philosophers: Kierkegaard, Kant, Diderot, Hume, Smith and others, all shared a similar 
history. It is from that philosophical and religious history that their beliefs were structured and 
thus their supposed enlightened understanding of philosophy.14 MacIntyre argues that their 
beliefs and philosophies are dominated by both a Christian past and a Greek teleological 
understanding of philosophy (the latter will be explained later in the paper).15 These historical 
                                                 
12 Ibid, 269.  
13 Ibid, 4 
14 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 51. – Even though my focus is on philosophy as a whole and the way it will affect the 
political structure of a state, in this portion of the book that I am focusing on, MacIntyre is primarily focused on their 
moral understanding of the philosophy and the world. Though it is from this moral understanding, that MacIntyre 
will introduce predictive science and its affect on politics.   
15 MacIntyre, 51; 56.  
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constraints do not allow for a proper secularized and progressive philosophy that was desired out 
of the enlightenment project. 
Kierkegaard, Hume and Kant all believed that promise keeping and justice are to be seen 
as inviolable. Further, Diderot the ‘rationalist philosopher’ saw the importance of marriage and 
the family as unquestionable as did the Lutheran Kierkegaard.16 For MacIntyre this is very 
important when understanding the enlightenment project. We cannot simply look at it as an era 
of enlightened secularization; stepping out of the old cave of ignorance, into the bright world of 
the educated knowers. We have to remember, that our beliefs are influenced from a young age, 
regardless of how much we learn, and that the world that surrounds us influences even our best 
philosophers.17 MacIntyre argued that we can account for Christian influence by showing their 
Christian roots; Kierkegaard and Kant the Lutherans, Hume the Presbyterian and Diderot the 
Jansenist Catholic.18 Even with all the Christian influence bestowed upon them, they were still 
trying to spear head the enlightenment project by “constructing valid arguments which will move 
from premises concerning human nature as they understand it to be to conclusions about the 
authority of moral arguments and precepts.”19 This was destined to fail, since they began with 
pre-existing historical and religious beliefs, and tried to construct their arguments to fit them. 
When philosophy was accepted to be secular in nature, and as it progressed in secularity, 
it caused a desire to be more scientific as a means to overcome religious constraints.20 Becoming 
more scientific, the idea that the mind can be separate from the physical, while still being apart 
                                                 
16 Ibid, 51. 
17 Ibid, 51-52; Hans-Georg Gadamer, Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato, trans P. 
Christopher Smith (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980), 44.  
18 MacIntyre, 51.  
19 Ibid, 52.  
20 Ibid, 4. – “At the beginning of [the XIXth] century, this claim was reaffirmed by philosophers… who were 
concerned to keep philosophy ‘rigorous’ and ‘scientific.’ But there was a note of desperation in their voices for by 
this time the triumph of secular over the claims of religion was almost complete.” – There was a notion that 
philosophy was no longer a science. Causing a desire for philosophy to be a science once more.  
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of it in some manner seems relatively absurd, for how can something exist in two planes at once? 
Thus, the mind-body problem stopped being about explaining how the mind exists outside the 
physical and still acts within it; it turned to explaining how the mind is reducible to the physical, 
and this started with Hobbes and his desire for a more empirical philosophy.21 For Hobbes it was 
a way to overcome the mind-body problem of having to explain how the two can co-exist, 
without existing in the same realms.  
Hobbes had the empirical desire, that all things of the mind, are reducible to the physical, 
that in the end all things are physical. This empirical desire was necessary in order to demarcate 
philosophy from religion. Rorty explains it as a ratiocination of knowledge from appearances.22 
For Hobbes and those with the desire to secularize philosophy and to distinguish it from other 
forms of belief creation or knowledge gain, this was an attempt to keep philosophy as a science, 
to ensure that philosophy does not become a theological act of revelation, that it stay as an act of 
discovery.23 The process of philosophic discovery as a science, for Hobbes and Rorty, is one that 
is based on the physical world, to some what appears to be and for them the ‘is.’ Once a 
philosophers begin to accept the idea that the mind does not exist and all things are reducible to 
the physical, Rorty argues that one must accept that the world as it appears, is the world as it 
‘is.’24 The reason being that if all things are found in the physical world, than everything is as it 
appears, since there is nothing else.  
                                                 
21 Rorty, 131. 
22 Ibid, 131. - For the enlightenment philosophers, they were not necessarily aware of their historical constraints. 
However, philosophers such as Descartes and Hobbes, they were very aware of their cultures and they ensured that 
their philosophical writings did not insult their society as a means to stay safe. In order to stay safe, to be taken 
seriously by society, and to have a philosophy that can ‘sway’ the masses, one must stay within the bounds of 
societies beliefs. One cannot expect to convince anyone of a truth that does not follow what they already believe. To 
go against what the masses hold to be true and real, puts one at risk. Epistemology is naturally safe for philosophers 
to engage in. So long as the common ground is held, it is never controversial.  
23 Ibid, 131-132.  
24 Ibid, 131-132.  
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 For Rorty, those looking to keep the notion of the mind in a physical world are going 
against rational thought. They are setting up their philosophic arguments for failure, since they 
are hindering progress, by ignoring their new initial point of knowing.25 Locke’s theory of 
knowledge was created to overcome the ‘problem of criterion’ – “the problem of validating 
procedures of inquiry while avoiding either circularity or dogmatism.”26 What Locke wanted to 
accomplish according to Rorty was to find a way in which knowledge claims could be grounded 
in the physical, while keeping the mind. He believed that we could justify beliefs through proper 
and rational explanation, ultimately accounting for reality. In this sense, Locke wanted a 
philosophy and theory of knowledge that is founded upon explanation and justification, that our 
inner representations are accurate.27 In doing this, Locke solidified the idea of the mind (or at 
least he hoped to), since it can be internally represented and believed as accurate. From there one 
could be completely justified through a proper and rational explanation of it. If the mind is true, 
then by extension all other inner representation should also be true. According to Rorty, it is that 
grounding of truth in rational explanation and justification that solidified the idea of subjectivity 
in later philosophers. The idea of subjectivity rather than objectivity would create even more 
problems for epistemology. 
 The idea of subjectivity as relevant is what caused Kant’s philosophy to separate 
philosophy from science.28 Prior to Kant (and during his time to some), philosophy and science 
were seen as one in the same if not they were at least in the same field. It was understood that 
those who engaged in philosophy engaged in science and vice versa. The reason a distinction 
came about was do to the demarcating effect of a ‘theory of knowledge.’ The practice of 
                                                 
25 Ibid, 138-139. 
26 Ibid, 139. 
27 Ibid, 140-141.  
28 Ibid, 132. – “It was not until Kant that our modern philosophy-science distinction took hold.” 
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philosophy that followed from Kant was not one of discovering the ‘highest,’ rather it was 
discovering the ‘underlying.’29 The notion of the ‘highest’ would be a scientific endeavour and 
the ‘underlying’ would be purely philosophical. The scientist (chemists, physicists and 
biologists), would be focused on what the meta-physicists were before: what are the elements? 
What moves the planets? What are people made of? The ‘underlying’ would become the sole 
focus of philosophers; philosophy would become “How is knowledge possible?”30  
 For Rorty this came about for two reasons: the first being the philosophical desire to 
understand how we create knowledge and the second being science surpassing philosophy’s 
abilities to explain the universe. The traditional approaches of empirical philosophy to 
experience reality and then being able to explain it was no longer sufficient.31 Philosophy was 
failing to explain how things truly were.32 In trying to create a theory of knowledge, by reducing 
the mental realm to the physical while separating philosophy from science, philosophers were 
setting up an irreversible problem for epistemology.33 Thus, epistemic philosophy is not able to 
make the same kind of general assertions and laws found within scientific theories.34  
 Kant’s final hand in the problem of epistemology came from his desire to professionalize 
the art of philosophy. Ultimately keeping alive the idea that philosophy could be a science; an art 
focused on the universal and the particular. This caused the philosopher to have no choice but to 
understand the beginning of particular critiques. This according to Rorty was especially 
problematic as it made philosophy impossible to be taken seriously, since it is built upon the idea 
                                                 
29 Ibid, 132. 
30 Ibid, 132. 
31 On top of that, purely rational philosophy (and hardly explored by Rorty) was even less capable as an a prior 
philosophy, that knowledge or things are prior to experience. 
32 Ibid, 241.  
33 While other scientific fields were specializing and professionalizing their traits and sub-traits, philosophy was 
trying to explore all things of knowledge. 
34 Ibid, 134; MacIntyre, 88. 
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of problems (criticisms of ideas and paradigms). With every thought and every paradigm comes 
an explanation as to why it is a problem.35 Thus the problem of epistemic philosophy would 
seem to be a problem with philosophy itself, since the mere professionalization of it created a 
sense of perpetual problems, rather than solutions. The activity of epistemic philosophy has 
created a sense of reduction, that all things physical must be attached in some way to the mental, 
causing the more likely, all things mental are reducible to the physical. The next step is: if the 
mental can be reduced to the physical, how is philosophy to do that?  
 For Rorty philosophy cannot complete the task of reducing the mental to the physical, as 
it has reduced it as far as it can. The need for justification, set up by Locke and continued by 
Kant, does not allow philosophy to finish its epistemological task. Rorty desired a more 
mathematical truth, rather than what he calls “humdrum truths.”36 The humdrum truth is one 
founded upon argument only and is subjective in nature, while mathematical truth or fact and 
theories are founded upon empirical data: objective in nature. Thus a subjective truth is justified 
purely through hermeneutics and the best argument, while the objective truth is justified by 
empirical scientific rigour.37 This notion of scientific rigour is what Rorty is looking for, it is 
what modern philosophers missed out on, as they relied more on their knowledge and ability to 
rationalize and give good arguments, rather than having “facts” to back themselves up. For Rorty 
we must move forward, our society must evolve and avoid the reductionist tendencies of before, 
in order to ensure that we do not fall back into the rational versus empirical battle that plagued 
previous philosophical paradigms.38  
                                                 
35 Ibid, 149. – In explaining the problem of philosophical professionalization, Rorty is not saying that it is an 
inherent problem, he is merely arguing that the way in which Kant professionalized the art, cemented as 
problematic.  
36 Ibid, 156. 
37 Ibid, 160; 241. – The objective for Rorty and empiricists. 
38 Ibid, 213.  
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The problem with epistemology furthers as we consider another argument outlined by 
MacIntyre; the scheme in which philosophers decided to develop their moral arguments: the 
Greek tradition. They opted to use the pre-existing teleological scheme, that “there is a 
fundamental contrast between man-as-he-happens-to-be and man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-
his-essential-nature.”39 Discovering and understanding this contrast is what MacIntyre called the 
‘science of ethics.’ In its basic form one must come to understand how man is, in order to then 
discover how he ‘ought to be.’ How he ‘ought to be’ is his true telos (his true end).40 This is to 
discover the end of humans, as the end of an acorn is to be a tree. However, for people, it is not 
always that simple; the end of a first responder is to save lives, the end of an electronics 
technician is to fix electronics. As we can see these are two people, however, their ends appear to 
be different. This desire for the ends of people is another aspect that pushes towards the need for 
specialization, since all arts require an end and in order to do that art to the best of one’s ability 
and reach its true end, one must specialize in it. Not specializing an art puts it at a disadvantage. 
When all other arts have specialized they will be better at that which they do and will thus reach 
their ends more efficiently and more effectively, giving them more legitimacy. As such, 
philosophy requires specialization.  
 The problem of ends and specialization in of themselves do not necessarily cause the 
failure of the enlightenment. What ultimately causes the failure was trying to adhere to 
preconceived notions (religious and teleological), while trying steer clear of them at the same 
time. By adhering to a Christian understanding of morality, while trying to be secular creates a 
problem. The second is having a teleological understanding of person, while not accepting an 
objective teleological universe to study and base our telos upon. In this respect they fail because 
                                                 
39 MacIntyre, 52.  
40 Ibid, 52.  
 12/26 
they have philosophical schemes, that require a higher authority to link their account to, while 
rejecting and ignoring the higher authority altogether.41 This ultimately led to the failure of the 
enlightenment project. This failure of the enlightenment is what ultimately allows for Rorty to 
argue that philosophy has run its course; philosophy is no longer able to be a true science, and is 
thus no longer relevant.  
Today’s empirical research is far more complicated than what philosophical investigation 
allows, and requires a kind of rigour that philosophy cannot amount to. The assumption with 
philosophy and what it has come to in the era of specialization is knowledge gain based on 
linguistic understanding.42 As such, if it is through understanding based on language, it itself 
cannot engage with the macro world of space or the micro world of biology. With that being a 
fact for Rorty, he then asks how can philosophers make criticisms or decisions about empirical 
research and investigation.43 Rorty explains that the only reason the philosopher persists is due to 
their fear of psychology and the loss of personhood: the fear of both or either the mechanism and 
the animalization of person.44 Philosophers seem to fear this idea that if we allow the social 
science to amalgamate society into empirical data representations that we will lose the essence 
that makes people persons. However, Rorty explains that this fear, this coming of psychology 
and its ever increasing hold on the social sciences is due to philosophers and their reductionist 
tendencies; they continuously reduce everything to a single point, which inevitably caused them 
                                                 
41 Ibid, 55. – “They inherited incoherent fragments of a once coherent scheme of thought and action and, since they 
did not recognize their own peculiar historical and cultural situation, they could not recognize the impossible and 
quixotic character of their self-appointed task.”  
42 Rorty, 70-73. 
43 Ibid, 216.  
44 Ibid, 217. – Although not every philosopher in history is afraid of the idea of the ‘mechanism’ (Hobbes for 
example was not). Further, each philosopher would be skeptical of the ‘mechanism’ in varying degrees. The fear 
comes down to a complete mechanisation of humanness or, to some, the end of humanness.   
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to desire both a ‘unified and singular science’ and a singular understanding of individual 
behaviour.45  
 Prior to Willard Van Oman Quine, philosophers believed that they could contribute to the 
unification of science, that started at the beginning of the XIXth Century.46 It was this tendency to 
rationalize and to reduce all things that, according to Rorty, stems from epistemology and caused 
philosophers to believe a unified science of all things is for the best. Though, for Rorty, it will be 
their inevitable downfall. Epistemology at this point can no longer continue, there is no way to 
justify knowledge philosophically by reducing all things to the physical. For Rorty epistemology 
has to start from the notion that the physical is the start of all knowledge, this has to be true. 
Once accepted the epistemic philosopher must look at the mental, and discover how it is 
ultimately reducible to the physical. The problem is that our current scientific understanding of 
ourselves, has forced us to look at synapses, DNA and molecules, something Rorty argues the 
philosopher cannot, since it cannot be simply reasoned, it must be done through scientific 
experimentation.47 These studies are to be done by psychologists, as that is within their field of 
specialization. 
 Epistemology, the the desire of reduction and specialization has brought us to the point 
that philosophy is no longer able to do what it wishes to do. If philosophers had their way they 
would have been the masters of science as they once were, or at the very least they could be part 
of the scientific world. However, Kant put philosophy onto an irreversible path toward being 
unscientific, regardless of Cartesian and Hobbesian attempts to make it scientific. Now it is at the 
                                                 
45 Ibid, 217. 
46 Ibid, 217. 
47 Granted not all philosophers simply reason, there has always been a tradition of empirical and rational philosophy. 
However, both have a sense of reason being the ultimate form of proof and that is the problem. Reason can no 
longer be the basis for good proof. Data, pure empirical truths must be the basis for good proof.  
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point where it would be simply trying to stay relevant. This attempt to stay within relevance, 
Rorty argues to be damaging to the progress of scientific knowledge.  
The attempt to stay relevant comes out from the failure of the enlightenment and the 
problem of epistemology, which did not come without. What the enlightenment did cause, is that 
it cemented the idea of the individual. By creating a world bereft of a telos and a structuring 
theism, moral, political and other philosophical arguments could not longer point to a higher 
authority so easily. Without a telos, we can no longer have a world where ‘ought’ can come from 
‘is.’48 The reason that we can no longer have ‘ought’ from is and why that helps create the idea 
of individual, is that without a telos, we can no longer argue, this is how things are, how person 
‘x’ is, and this is how things could be, or person ‘x’ ought to be or act. Each person is now the 
subjective director of their actions, persons as having functions goes off to the side and we now 
act as free agents.49 Such a world leaves us with secular individuals.  
 Without the structuring higher authority, there becomes a need for new schemes, a new 
way to structure our understanding of people: Utilitarianism. Rather than society directing itself 
towards some sort of telos, individuals should direct themselves towards the utility of self and 
society.50 The utility of society would be defined by the psychologist Jeremy Bentham and he 
would define it as pleasure or happiness. The key components of utilitarianism would than be 
pleasure for society and self, by looking at the number of people affected by an action (or law), 
the intensity of the pleasure (or pain) and the duration of the pleasure (or pain).51 This for 
MacIntyre would be the defining moment and the end of the philosophical input of the 
enlightenment (becoming an educated society), a turning from knowledge (philosophy of people) 
                                                 
48 MacIntyre, 59.  
49 Ibid, 59.  
50 Ibid, 62.  
51 Ibid, 62 
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to happiness (psychology of people).52 This then coincides with Rorty, that psychology will 
dominate and replace philosophy if people are educated properly. 
 Psychology according to MacIntyre takes hold and seems important, is in line with 
Rorty’s belief that psychology is the next paradigm of philosophy. It has the ability to bridge the 
gap between what seems (appears to be) and what is (truly is).53 Thus the reason psychology as a 
science is regarded so highly is do to what the other sciences have done for understanding and 
knowing our universe. Prior to science and proper theory, when looking at the night sky one 
would have seen light spots on a dark sheet, rather than stars, planets, asteroids and so on, that 
we know to be there today.54 This is what Rorty wants from psychology, to be able to look at 
people, and society and explore and theorize exactly what we are, so that we may know what we 
are, in order to have a properly educated society that can then act according to our true selves, 
not as we have perceived ourselves in the past.  
 From psychological knowledge of ourselves, we must accept the secular world developed 
by the enlightened epistemic philosophers. Thus there is a requirement for an overarching 
structural entity which would direct our behaviours, or as Rorty explain it, control our 
behaviours. This control or at least the ability to attempt in controlling human behaviour (or 
action) comes from the predictive power of the social sciences. Psychologist and the social 
scientists claim to the have the ability to predict human behaviour. They can engage in proper 
experiment, develop theories of people, in general law like fashions of the sciences.55 If one can 
                                                 
52 Ibid, 63. – “Bentham’s view… educated mind… will recognize that the pursuit of mu happiness as dictated by mu 
pleasure-seeking, pain-avoiding psychology and the pursuit of the greatest number do in point of fact coincide… 
social reformer [should] reconstruct the social order so that even the unenlightened pursuit of happiness will produce 
the greatest possible happiness for the greatest possible number.” 
53 Ibid, 80. – As explored earlier, a key aspect of philosophy is to be able to discern the difference between what 
appears to be and what is. Though for psychology to truly replace philosophy, it would need to engage in not only as 
the world is, but how it truly is.  
54 Ibid, 79, 80.  
55 Ibid, 91.  
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predict human behaviour they can control human behaviour.56 If someone or an entity is capable 
of predicting what someone or at the very least what a society is going to do, they can put 
something in place to stop them. If a government knows that no matter what, people will do 
something even if a law exists, they can change the law and make the act legal to a certain extant 
to discourage improper action regarding the thing.  
All a government needs to know is what actions will be and whether they can be or 
cannot be stopped. Thus, in such a societal or governing structure, action becomes value free and 
‘ought’ becomes ‘is.’57 The reason action becomes bereft of value is not that it is truly without it, 
it is because it must be seen as such. The act is simply the act, it will or will not happen. If it will, 
how does one stop it or at the very least mitigate the potential negative effects caused by the 
action. From this ‘ought’ becomes ‘is,’ since what ‘is,’ ‘ought’ to be. There is no longer an 
‘ought’ we act as such, there is only this ‘is’ how we are, or how we will act, thus we ‘ought’ to 
act as such, since this is what person is. In order to control people as they are, to keep civic order 
and the desired scientific progress, there must be an entity in place that does so. Such an entity is 
already in existence and has in essence always existed since the beginning of governments: the 
bureaucracy.  
The bureaucracy inevitably becomes the authority on the knowledge of personness.58 
This is only possible in such a world or society where the people are secular and accept 
government authority. Further, in such a society that is educated in such a manner where they 
accept the legitimacy of government intervention in society. This is made possible by 
                                                 
56 Ibid 84. 
57 Ibid 84. 
58 Ibid, 86. 
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specialization of trades, services and the sciences, which in turn allows the civil society of the 
bureaucracy to lay claim to being an or the authority on the knowledge of personness.  
Due to the specialization of academia, the education civil servants receive will be 
specialized towards their duties, thus allowing them to claim expertise in the bureaucratic 
governing of people.59 From this we receive a government of managers and a government that is 
scientific.60 A government of managers means that they manage society, they control it. They 
have a set of knowledge, that they make claim to be experts of. A scientific government is one 
that has information that is data bound, that is from experimentation or intellectual sources. This 
is not to say that the government itself goes out and does the study, though nothing is stopping it 
from doing so. This is to say that the government is capable of and desires to use information 
that is available to it. As a managing entity that uses scientific knowledge, the government can 
make the claim that it can intervene in society, not based on its authority to do so, rather, because 
it has both the resources and the know-how to do so.61 As such, it stops being about whether 
society accepts the authority of the government because they have been educated to do so.  
Society accepts the knowledge claim of the government, based on their education that the 
government has such a claim to knowledge. From such a reformation of society, the distinction 
between manipulative and non-manipulative social interactions disappear.62 There is only the 
knowledge claim. Thus, any speech claimed to be within the common ground of knowledge, is 
naturally non-manipulative at all times (how ever it could be believed to be manipulative to 
some). Since, it is always constraining thought to only think towards a particular end: the desired 
scientific progress of the bureaucracy and society. For society this would be acceptable. Any 
                                                 
59 Ibid, 85.  
60 Ibid, 85.  
61 Ibid, 85-86. 
62 Ibid, 86. 
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speech where one is trying to expand their personal knowledge against the common ground, will 
naturally be seen as manipulative and counter productive to progress. However, it would not be 
taken seriously and thus would become non-manipulative and simply be seen as ‘abnormal.’63 
The reason that such a society is possible is due to the way in which psychological discourse and 
education must take place, and that discourse must be against philosophical traditions. 
Specifically it must be against the philosophic tradition of hermeneutics, which by its very nature 
is against control. 64 Hermeneutics has two forms of discourse: ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal.’ Normal 
discourse is objective and thus directed towards the truth, and abnormal discourse is subjective, 
thus directed at feelings and values.65 As such, it is against the socially reformed bureaucratic 
government, since it allows for action full of value. It allows for such a world and an 
understanding where ‘ought’ is distinct from ‘is.’  
For the hermeneutic tradition, these two forms of discourse do not compete, rather they 
help each other out. The abnormal discourse helps us understand how things are for individuals, 
while the normal discourse helps us understand how things are as a whole, or how the whole 
appears to be. Another way of putting this is that the abnormal is the discussion on particulars, 
while the normal is the discussion on the universal. All of this is supposed to direct us towards a 
common ground. The problem for psychology is that having the two does not. The abnormal 
discourse hinders our ability to stay within the common ground.66 For Rorty this becomes an 
issue, since there is no assumption of a common ground in hermeneutics. One does not argue 
                                                 
63 Rorty, 346. – Here Rorty begins to explain the problems hermeneutics causes for psychology, that it allows for 
two forms of speech. One that is directed at universal things (normal) and one that is directed at particular things 
(abnormal). For him the normal speech is non-manipulative and beneficial for society. Abnormal is manipulative 
and requires people to persuade others. For MacIntyre and Rosen, this is not the case. If one is engaged in proper 
dialogue and trying to discover truths and understand reality with their fellow interlocutors, there is no persuasion, 
only the mutual benefit of knowledge gain.  
64 Ibid, 359-360.  
65 Ibid, 346. 
66 Ibid, 346-347. 
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from a starting commonality. Psychology on the other hand, which stems from epistemic 
traditions, begins from a preconceived notion of commonality and is always ‘normal’ discourse 
and never ‘abnormal,’ rather, it should never be ‘abnormal.’67 
 Abnormal discourse acts as a stopper in psychological dialectic, for how can one come to 
understand the whole, if one particular subjective is given substantial weight inside or against the 
objective. For hermeneutic philosophers, this is not a problem; for Rorty, it is irrational. This 
problem does not simply live within psychology, it extends itself out into the sciences. The 
reason it does not cause a problem for philosophy, is that it has a sense of rationality unmatched 
by any other field, that it is capable of engaging with other fields, or so philosophers believe.68 
However, Rorty believes that since psychology was born out of philosophy and that it has 
discovered things philosophy could and can not, it is the natural next step for the field, the new 
paradigm.69 He asserts that a properly educated population would understand that philosophy 
cannot be put above psychology, for only a skeptical society (a society that believes in ‘valued 
action’) would feel that way, a society ruled by its feelings and values, rather than facts.70 
Finally, it is not discourse that discovers truths and facts, it is data. Discourse is only capable of 
explaining facts of data from scientific exploration and experimentation.71 
 For those reasons, we must not engage in hermeneutics, as it only leads us further away 
from truly knowing. We must then go further towards psychology as a true replacement for 
epistemology and philosophy alike. That will allow us to focus our academic pursuits on the 
‘cognitive’ truths rather than ‘noncognitive’ truths.72 The noncognitive truths are in essence all 
                                                 
67 Ibid, 346.  
68 Ibid, 241.  
69 Ibid, 223.  
70 Ibid, 364.  
71 Ibid, 277 “hard facts” are about the actual, “other talk” is about “hard facts;” 348-349; 373.  
72 Ibid, 342. – Cognitive truths are for normal discourse, non-cognitive truths are for abnormal discourse.  
 20/26 
those things that most philosophers have spent time developing, or as Rorty puts them, the 
mental creations of man. These mental creations would include religion, spirit, soul, mind and 
telos as some examples. We need to focus on the cognitive, real truths that exist in the physical 
world that are not simple man made creations to explain what we do not understand. In focusing 
on the cognitive our society can truly progress and move forward. For Rorty only the skeptical 
(philosopher and religious fanatics) are holding us back. 
 In order to understand the world as it is, and thus how it should be, we must give into 
psychology. Since psychology can truly discover facts and truths, we can know how people are 
and we can then control them, educate them with our psychological understanding so that society 
acts the way it is supposed to, as it was through psychological exploration that we truly 
discovered, that man is no different than an animal. With that as a fact, than we can study man’s 
behaviour as any other animal, and control him in the same manner.73 Philosophers and skeptics 
would fear this idea, of truly reducing humans to animals that behave simply. Reducing us to 
simple data points on a graph that can be manipulated. For Rorty this is not a necessary problem, 
as our humanness as we know it is a mental creation from our cultures. Our cultures manifest 
themselves from our mental manifestations, and only persist, because we refuse to move forward 
as a society.74 For Rorty, if we progress forward, and finally give up our mental manifestations 
that we believe to be reality, we could truly discover reality, and live in a society built around 
reality; we could live in a proper society, one where truth and fact exist, one were the cognitive 
rules, not the noncognitive.  
                                                 
73 Ibid, 192. – It was prior to psychology as a term, that we knew we were animals, in fact for most of our history we 
understood this, but we were substantially different and could not be reduced so simply, until psychological 
understanding on man came. 
74 Ibid, 186. 
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 This is the ultimate source of human knowledge and that which the bureaucracy 
(authority of knowledge of personness) must lay claim to know: cognitive action. This does not 
require any sort of linguistic awareness of personness;75 our linguistic awareness only allows us 
to understand that our feeling of something, might be different for a human than for an animal.76 
The cognition of something, is the same not matter where one looks. It doesn’t matter when one 
is looking at the raw elements of it.77 When it comes to understanding through language of a 
thing, one must truly know it and understand it. The knowing of rawness, does not require 
linguistic knowledge, only that it is as it is. Since it is raw, it is as it is, it is as it ought to be. 
Without any linguistic understanding of it, that is understanding it hermeneutically, there is no 
human understanding of it. We only understand it in its most basic form. There is only 
understanding the thing as it appears, or as it truly is in its most basic element.  
When engaging in bureaucratic control of it from such a foundation of knowledge, one is 
only going based on the basic rawness of it. There is no politics in this governance. The 
governing entity, whether it is the bureaucracy, a dictator, or a legislative assembly that receives 
its information from the scientific bureaucracy, there is no longer any politics. The reason being 
that this bureaucracy and government as a whole is not engaging in hermeneutic dialogue. There 
is no normal and abnormal discourse, there is simply normal discourse. The reason being is that 
politics is inherently hermeneutic and hermeneutics is inherently political.78 Further, 
hermeneutics as discussed earlier is a means to overcome the dominantly controlling socially 
scientific bureaucracy born out of the failure of the enlightenment project.  
                                                 
75 Ibid, 190.  
76 Ibid, 190.  
77 Ibid, 189-190.  
78 Rosen, 3.  
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Hermeneutics requires both normal and abnormal discourse. In order to come to know 
anything, one must discuss the particulars (which some might call the subjective) and the whole 
(which some might call the objective). The reason being, is that society is a conglomerate. It is 
not one singular mass; it is a mass of many parts. To not engage in abnormal dialogue is to omit 
the some of that which makes society society. Further, this allows for a society whose reason is 
constrained by its understanding.79 We may at that point only engage in dialogue that is ‘normal’ 
as deemed by the authority or authorities on that understanding. That in of itself is not a 
necessary problem, if their claim is both true and their understanding of the thing is true.  
However, if society is to be educated in such a manner, that they may be controlled, then 
there can never be any doubt on the understanding that constrains their knowledge. There can 
never be any hermeneutic discussion. This creates a world in which there is only an obedience to 
rules, no knowledge of anything other than the rules in which one must live by.80 One could be 
educated of freedom and engage in normal discussion of the freedom that they are constrained to 
know of. However, there would be no knowledge of freedom, or what freedom is itself. One 
would not have knowledge of what it means to be free, or if one ought to be free, simply that one 
is free, and in a society governed by a socially scientific bureaucracy, their freedom would be as 
it ought to be, since it is. Another issue without freedom or hermeneutics, is the lack of politics.  
 Politics is inherently hermeneutic, since both acts are inherently dialogical.81 Politics is 
always in flux. It is not stagnating and does not stand still. It is for this reason that “speech is 
superior to writing for political reasons. We can adjust our conversation to the nature of the 
interlocutor, in the way that the equity of the judge adjusts the written law to the individual 
                                                 
79 Ibid, 4.  
80 Ibid, 4.  
81 Ibid, 3.  
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case.”82 The scientific nature of the socially scientific state does not allow for flux, it is always 
written, it is always as it ‘is.’. It must constrain and show only what is known. Thus the socially 
scientific state cannot allow for politics, it can only allow for governance. It is a state built up of 
people that cannot engage in things not known, if it outside the possibility of the common 
ground.  
A state that allows for hermeneutics, has politics. Hermeneutics unlike psychology does 
not begin from a predetermined common ground of knowing. Rather, it moves towards a point of 
knowing that can be common. Though when engaging in knowing it can never allow that 
common ground to constrain further knowing. It can acknowledge the common ground, though 
in doing so it must accept that it is not common, and thus cannot constrain.83  
 For Psychology as a product of epistemology cannot do so. It must begin from a common 
ground of knowing and it must allow that common ground to constrain further knowing. Since 
all knowing must progress from the beginning point.84 This allows for progress. However, the 
progress itself is constrained in light of the initial constraint. Hermeneutics allows one to 
overcome this, and truly allows for societal progress in understanding people and how they 
‘ought to be.’ Since hermeneutics does not begin from an initial point of knowing, it begins from 
either an acceptance of what was known or what was not known, in order to come to what ‘is,’ or 
what ‘ought to be.’  
 As such, the the socially scientific state, does not allow for any sort of true freedom, or 
politics. This is not based purely on the bureaucratic control, rather it is because the state does 
not allow for true knowledge gain, knowing of freedom, nor full dialogue to allow for politics. It 
                                                 
82 Ibid, 87.  
83 Ibid, 87-88.  
84 Rorty, 316; MacIntyre, 80.  
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constrains the way in which people can be, not allowing people to sway from the common 
ground of knowing, since it requires that common ground to stay in existence, to allow for the 
progress it desires: both towards civic order and scientific progress.  
This is not a new phenomenon of the post-modern era. The notion of a common ground 
constraining, has always been. Traditions and customs have always constrained people’s actions 
and ability to gain knowledge, and governments have in some sense desired some sort of 
scientific progress. The newness here is the means and tools the bureaucracy can employ. 
Further, the post-modern notions of the individual and mass quantitative data.  
With free roaming individuals that are not bound by a meta-physical notion or religious 
tenants, there is nothing watching them and constraining them. The government cannot simply 
hope or believe that the people will abide by these higher authorities. It must educate the people 
to believe that the government can control their lives, so that it may have free reign to intervene 
in their lives; not based based on an acceptance of authority or philosophic understanding of 
good citizen. Rather, it is based on its authority on the knowledge of personness and an educated 
society to accept that authority on knowledge.  
The only current saving grace, is hermeneutics as means to overcome the ‘normal’ 
constraints of the psychological common ground. Through hermeneutics people may engage in 
abnormal dialogue, accept that there is no true common ground, in order to have a true 
understanding on things. This would allow for politics to live within society, ultimately allowing 
for a true freedom of people. Further, it would keep persons as persons. Such a society would not 
be unruly, such a society would require friendship and an acceptance of others. Constructive and 
amicable dialogue cannot happen amongst enemies,85 it can only happen amongst friends and it 
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cannot happen amongst mechanic or animalized persons, that only have one notion of common 
knowledge. Further, the hermeneutic society would be interested in law and good governance, as 
it is always interested in how things ‘are,’ and how things ‘ought to be,’ in order to have further 
knowledge gain and live good lives amongst others.  
The socially scientific state is destined to eliminate freedom, politics and person, and 
replace them with constraint, control and animalized or mechanical people. Hermeneutic 
philosophy must stay relevant and it must branch out and allow society to accept it as legitimate 
and for government to engage hermeneutically. Ultimately allowing us to overcome the potential 
dominance of a purely subjective or purely objective knowledge based reality and live in a 
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